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WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL  
LAW TIGHTROPE:  
USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO COUNTER 
TERRORISM—WILLING THE ENDS 
Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto* 
he UN Charter reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a 
political system to govern conflicts between states. It does not di-
rectly address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in 
the post-World War II period. The drafters did not contemplate the exis-
tence of international terrorists nor their tenacity and access to technol-
ogy. In view of the fact that terrorist groups appear to have reached a 
global sophistication, there is little doubt that international terrorism pre-
sents a threat with which traditional theories for the use of military force 
are inadequate to deal with, and were not contemplated when the UN 
Charter was drafted. This Article is premised on the theme that the right 
to self-defence is enrolled in a process of change. The focal point of state 
practice in the Article is the United States, which has long sought to ar-
ticulate, through official policy, use of force as a counter-terrorism 
measure. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The senseless mayhem of World War I—the destruction of economic 
structures, dissipation of financial resources, and undermining of politi-
cal stability—wiped the gloss from the traditional notion of war as a ra-
tional political act. The war was disastrous to both its initiators and 
victims. Millions died pointlessly and whole regimes fell. The carnage 
forced modern industrial societies to question war as an instrument of 
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 1. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy 
art. 1, opened for signature Aug. 27, 1928, 46 U.S.T. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into 
force July 24, 1929) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. By the time it entered into force, 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact had been signed and ratified/acceded to by a total of fifty-nine 
States (including all the States (major and minor) that were subsequently to comprise the 
Axis Powers), almost all the States comprising the international community at that time. 
T 
406 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
national policy; where the benefits of conquest (a major incentive in pre-
vious centuries) seemed trivial by comparison with the costs of war—
large scale death and destruction, political instability and economic tur-
moil for all involved—it seemed obvious that war was no longer a profit-
able enterprise. 
In response to the destruction of World War I, the League of Nations 
formed as an international organization to usher in collective security and 
replace a centuries old militaristic balance of power, and was an ambi-
tious move to curb sovereign military excesses and guarantee world 
peace. However, it was during the League’s chequered existence that two 
issues of significance fell on the international agenda—terrorism and the 
limitation of the use of military force. With the formation of the League 
of Nations, and renewed efforts to prevent future violence, the freedom 
of states to resort to military force became more and more restricted, 
while the right of self-defence gained in significance, displacing the ex-
pansive right of self-preservation. 
One of the League’s most significant efforts was the creation and adop-
tion of the International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an In-
strument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928.1 The Pact 
prohibited war as an instrument of national policy and recognized the 
right of self-defence as a legal right, thus tacitly excluding other previ-
ously accepted forms of self-help as avenues legitimating the use of mili-
tary force.2 
                                                                                                             
 2. Kellogg-Briand Pact states: 
[P]ersuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an in-
strument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and 
friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; 
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought 
only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and 
that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national in-
terests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this  
Treaty . . . 
Have decided to conclude a Treaty; 
Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their 
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of inter-
national controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in 
their relations with one another. 
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of 
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, 
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. 
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Despite these efforts, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had its shortcomings. 
The prohibition of war, for instance, failed to be linked to a system of 
sanctions. Its preamble simply declared that a state violating the Pact 
“should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty.” An even more 
serious deficiency was the Pact’s failure to outlaw the use of force in 
general, as well as war. The Pact was eventually ratified by sixty-two 
states, and made an exception for self-defence, but failed to define it—
with the result that the customary criteria set out in the Caroline case 
remained the only legal bases for the use of force in international affairs. 
Strong on principle but lacking an enforcement mechanism, the Pact was 
doomed to have little practical effect,3 and the League of Nations’ au-
thority was challenged and whittled by a series of aggressive acts carried 
out by some of the then major powers (Japan, Italy and a resurgent Ger-
many) during the mid- to late 1930s. The League’s utility was finally 
terminated by the outbreak of World War II in 1939.4 
It was only after the destruction of World War II that the UN, the UN 
Charter, and the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established.5 The 
primary purpose of the new organization was “to maintain international 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
 3. The pact never made a meaningful contribution to international order, although it 
was invoked in 1929 with some success when China and the U.S.S.R. reached a tense 
moment over possession of the Chinese Eastern R.R. in Manchuria. Ultimately, however, 
the pact proved to be meaningless, especially with the practice of waging undeclared 
wars in the 1930s (e.g., the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion 
of Ethiopia in 1935, and the German occupation of Austria in 1938). See generally 
ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME 260 (Lewis P. Curtis ed., Yale Univ. Press 
1952) (1968). 
 4. In 1945, six years after the start of World War II, the Axis Powers were on the verge 
of total defeat and one of the blackest pages in human history was about to close. By May 
1945, Hitler’s envisaged Thousand-Year Reich lay in ruins. By August, Japan was devas-
tated, as the atomic bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki de-
stroyed Japan’s receding hope of carrying on its war of conquest. World War II was the 
most cruel and devastating conflict in history. In terms of lives lost, geographical extent, and 
cities reduced to ashes, the struggle defies rational comprehension. Over 17 million combat-
ants were killed, 27 million wounded and nearly 20 million captured or missing. Civilian 
populations were more affected by this war than any other in the past. JACKSON NYAMUYA 
MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FROM WORLD WAR I TO 
THE 21ST CENTURY 83 (2004). 
 5. The final step in making the UN Charter was taken at Yalta, in 1945, by the “Big 
Three” (the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia) with victory in sight. All the 
Allied States, great and small, were invited to the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization, which met in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare the final 
instrument for the new international organization. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD 
HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 4–8 (3d ed. 1969). 
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peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.”6 
Until the adoption of the UN Charter, there had been no customary 
prohibition on the unilateral resort to force if circumstances warranted it, 
and in many instruments states reserved the right to resort to force. While 
customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, 
and retribution as legitimate responses, the UN sought to impose limita-
tions on the unilateral use of force in resolving international disputes. 
Under the UN Charter, the right of self-defence was the only included 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force.7 
Thus, the UN Charter introduced to international politics a radically 
new notion: a general prohibition of the unilateral resort to force by 
states,8 as encapsulated in its most authoritative form in Article 2(4). The 
UN Charter identified the structural defect of the international political 
system and created a network of institutions and procedures. Rather than 
standing by itself, Article 2(4) was part and parcel of a complex security 
system.9 Under the UN Charter, unilateral acts of force not characterized 
as self-defence, regardless of motive, were made illegal.10 Individual or 
collective self-defence became the cornerstone relating to use of force, 
and, since then, has been invoked with regard to almost every use of ex-
ternal military force.11 
However, during the Cold War, it was increasingly clear that terrorists 
were using technology to “exploit the vulnerabilities of modern socie-
                                                                                                             
 6. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. The “Dumbarton Oaks Proposals” were taken as 
the basis for the discussions that were to lead to the UN Charter. 
 7. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
 8. Various legal instruments have reinforced the prohibition of the use of force since 
the adoption of the UN Charter. These include: Article 5 of the Pact of the Arab League, 
reaffirmed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de Ja-
neiro on September 2, 1947; Charter of the Organization of American States (Bogota 
Charter), article 5 condemns aggression, article 15 forbids intervention, and article 18 
prohibits use of force except in self-defence; the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence 
(known as Pancha Sila), first formulated in April 29, 1954 between India and the PRC; 
the final communiqué of the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung of April 24, 1955 which 
gave approval to ten principles as the basis for promotion of world peace and coopera-
tion. 
 9. The Charter included provisions for collective and regional defence arrangements, 
and provisions on self-defence. 
 10. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 39–51. 
 11. See Jackson Maogoto, New Frontiers, Old Problems: The War on Terror and the 
Notion of Anticipating the Enemy, 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2004). 
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ties.”12 With citizens tending to live, work, and travel in close proximity 
providing concentrated targets, modern societies are particularly suscep-
tible to large-scale attacks and weapons of mass destruction.13 This fact 
was not lost on perpetrators of terrorism, as witnessed by its growing 
capabilities and lethalness throughout the Cold War era.14 The United 
States and Israel led the way in seeking to co-opt use of military force as 
a countermeasure against terrorism. The stance of the United States of 
“passive, reactive and patient defense” to terrorism in the early 1970s 
shifted to a “no compromise and very proactive approach” in the early 
1980s, encapsulated in the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines.”15 Subse-
quent U.S. presidents have relied on a similar tenet of swift, effective 
retribution to counter terrorism, often wrapping it up together with the 
right of anticipatory self-defence. 
Though terrorism has always been high on the international agenda, it 
was the attacks on September 11, 2001 that brought the issue of terrorism 
and the international regime on the use of force into a new, urgent, and 
sustained debate. The magnitude of the September 11th attacks went be-
yond terrorism as it was known, and statements from various capitals 
around the world pointed to a need to develop new strategies to confront 
a new reality. The attacks had seemingly generated the momentum for 
the international legal system to formally co-opt military response to 
counter-terrorism within the regime of lawful force contained in the UN 
Charter. 
The Bush administration prepared the ground for pre-emptive attacks 
by seeking to engage the accepted right of self-defence as a justification 
for military action against rogue states. Because of the new threats, the 
United States claimed, a proper understanding of the right of self-defence 
should now extend to authorizing pre-emptive attacks against potential 
aggressors, cutting them off before they would be able to launch strikes 
that might be devastating in their scale and scope.16 This aggressive ap-
                                                                                                             
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 4 (1999). 
 14. Id. at 6 (stating that between 1970 and 1995, on average, each year brought 206 
more incidents and 441 more fatalities). 
 15. Shirlyce Manning, The United States’ Response to International Air Safety, 61 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 505, 519 (1996); see Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western 
Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO 
TERRORISM 307, 316 (Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid eds., 1993). 
 16. The U.S. government’s position is encapsulated in the West Point Commence-
ment Address on June 1, 2002 and officially articulated in the NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY, released in September 2002. See George W. Bush, West Point Commence-
ment  Address (June 1, 2002) (announcing  an expansive new policy of preemptive mili-
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proach became a central tenet of the United States’ strategic posture 
known as the “Bush Doctrine.”17 Like the aggressive national policies 
before it, the “Bush Doctrine” seeks to “effectively clos[e] down danger-
ous regimes before they become imminent threats”18 and, thus, represents 
a usurpation of the Security Council’s role in global affairs. 
This Article commences with an overview of the UN Charter regime 
on the use of military force. It then proceeds to tackle its central theme 
—an examination of the genesis of the current U.S. policy of proactive 
action through military force to counter terrorism. Overall, the Article is 
premised on the theme that the right to self-defence is visibly enrolled in 
a process of change and evaluates this process within the uncertain and 
indeterminate framework of state practice and the legal regime articu-
lated in the UN Charter. The focal point of state practice in the Article is 
the United States, which has long sought to articulate, through official 
policy, use of force as a counter-terrorism measure. Though a handful of 
states (especially Israel) have treaded this path, it is the United States that 
has sought to articulate it as part of government policy. 
II. USE OF FORCE AND THE UN CHARTER 
Despite a general prohibition of force, the UN Charter recognizes that 
force may be necessary to restore order, and that states are entitled to 
defend themselves against aggression.19 This right is “inherent,” and cus-
tomary international law is the yardstick upon which the degree and 
                                                                                                             
tary action) [hereinafter West Point Commencement  Address]; THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 6 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ 
nss/pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
 17. The “Bush Doctrine” is the term that is now widely used by journalists, scholars 
and politicians alike to describe the pre-emption strategy championed by Paul Wolfowitz, 
Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy. See Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors, 
Chronology: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html (“Wolfowitz’s ‘Defense Planning Guidance’ draft 
argue[d] for a new military and political strategy in a post-Cold War world. Containment, 
it says, is a relic of the Cold War. America should talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use 
its military power to preempt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . .”). 
 18. Anthony Dworkin, Introduction, Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-
Defense, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, June 1, 2004, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/ 
bush-intro.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). See also Eyal Benvenisti, Expert Analysis, 
Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-Defense, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, June 
1, 2004, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/bush-benvenisti.html (last visited Jan. 27, 
2006). 
 19. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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manner of self-help should be measured.20 In the face of the UN Security 
Council’s inability to control the spread of international terrorism, debate 
as to the status of previously accepted military responses under custom-
ary international law remains strong, and many states have urged for an 
expansion of the legitimate use of force under the Charter. 
A. Article 2(4): Proscription of Force 
Article 2(3) of the Charter provides that “[a]ll members shall settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that in-
ternational peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”21 Article 
2(4) elaborates on the need for peaceful resolution of disputes: “All 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations.”22 
Article 2(4) is the provision on which present day jus ad bellum 
hinges.23 The use of force in international relations proscribed in the arti-
cle includes both war and other forcible measures short of war.24 Its sig-
nificance has been emphasized by international law scholars who label it 
“the cornerstone of this new regime” 25 that “promote[s] peace by prohib-
                                                                                                             
 20. The UN Charter  provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Secu-
rity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of 
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action 
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity.  
U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). 
 21. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. 
 22. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”) (emphasis added). 
 23. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) 
(noting that Article 2(4) articulates the “principle of the prohibition of force” in interna-
tional relations and avoids the term “war”). 
 24. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 25. Bartram S. Brown, Special Project: Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1687–88 (2000). 
412 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
iting the use of force and protecting the sovereignty of the member 
states”26 and “the heart of the United Nations Charter.”27 Undoubtedly, 
the wording of Article 2(4) constitutes a considerable improvement when 
compared with Article I of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In Article 2(4) the 
use of force in general is prohibited, rather than only war as in the Kel-
log-Briand Pact. Furthermore, under the Charter, the prohibition is not 
confined to the actual use of force but extends to the mere threat of 
force.28 Finally, the prohibition is, at least in theory, safeguarded by a 
system of collective sanctions against any offender.29 
The terms “territorial integrity” and “political independence” include 
most forms of armed force, and are not intended to restrict the scope of 
Article 2(4)’s prohibition of the use of force.30 Rather, the two given 
modes of the use of force cover any possible kind of trans-frontier use of 
armed force. Thus, an incursion into the territory of another state consti-
tutes an infringement of Article 2(4), even if it is not intended to deprive 
that state of part of its territory or if the invading troops are meant to 
withdraw immediately after completing a temporary and limited opera-
tion. In other words, “integrity” has to be read as “inviolability,” pro-
scribing any kind of forcible trespassing.31 Gaps that may possibly be left 
by these terms are filled by the remaining clause in Article 2(4), which 
outlaws the threat or use of force “in any other manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations.”32 
Notably, under Article 2(4) the prohibition of interstate force is not ap-
plicable to UN members only. The provision forbids use of force by UN 
members against any state. Recourse to force by non-member states is 
dealt with in Article 2(6).33 Article 2(6) is a radical provision that seeks 
to bind even non-signatories to the UN Charter in contravention of Arti-
                                                                                                             
 26. Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B. U. 
INT’L L.J. 195, 197 (1993). 
 27. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
1620, 1620 (1984). 
 28. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Kellogg-Briand pact, supra note 1. 
 29. See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51 (providing the Security Council with the right to 
decide where there is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and 
permitting necessary action to address such acts; furthermore, the Charter provides the 
rights of individual or collective self-defence). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Jackson Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law? The “Bush Doctrine” of Pre-
emptive Strikes and the UN Charter on the Use of Force, 7 U.W. SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 33–
34 (2003). 
 32. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 33. Id. art. 2, para. 6. 
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cle 35 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which   
states that an obligation inures on a third state only if it accepts the obli-
gation in writing.34 However, as Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties sets forth, treaty norms may become binding on third 
states as rules of customary international law.35 When conventional in-
ternational law crystallizes as customary law, the norm which has its 
genesis in a treaty becomes binding on a third state. 
The principle of prohibition of the threat or the use of force, well en-
shrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, has been further elaborated by 
several consensual law-making decisions of the UN General Assembly 
including, in particular, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations36 and 
the 1974 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression.37 The 1970 Decla-
ration on Friendly Relations, besides restating Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter,38 emphasizes that such threat or use of force “shall never be em-
ployed as a means of settling international issues.”39 
B. Article 51: The State’s Right to Respond in Self-Defence 
Having proscribed forcible self-help, the UN Charter nevertheless 
permits state actions that are reasonably necessary as self-defence in the 
face of an “armed attack.”40 The starting point for any discussion on the 
                                                                                                             
 34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 84, para. 1, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). 
 35. Id. art. 38. 
 36. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. 
 37. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142–43, U.N. GAOR, 29th 
Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 38. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 39. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 36, at 123. 
 40. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 432–
33 (1963). Professor Brownlie has categorised several Article 51 exceptions to the re-
strictions on the use of force. They are as follows: 
1. acts of self-defence; 
2. acts of collective self-defence; 
3. actions authorised by a competent international organ (e.g., the United Na-
tions Security Council); 
4. where treaties confer rights to intervene or where an ad hoc invitation or 
consent is given by the territorial sovereign; 
5. actions to terminate trespass; 
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subject of self-defence is Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that 
“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”41 Although the 
wording of the article appears clear—the right of self-defence is gener-
ated when an attack occurs, i.e., the attack must be occurring before the 
use of force is legitimate—practice has shown that the picture can be 
more complicated. 
In particular, the use of the term “inherent” has polarized commenta-
tors and states.42 Though the Charter does not indicate what rights are 
“inherent,” the inclusion of this term was considered significant enough 
by the drafters of the Charter to warrant its inclusion when revising Arti-
cle 51.43 The initial draft of Article 51 made no mention of this “inherent 
right,” but it was changed to make the definition of self-defence ac-
knowledge that right.44 Despite the ongoing debate, a major question re-
mains whether the right of self-defence under Article 51 is limited to 
cases of armed attack or whether there are other instances in which self-
defence may be available under Article 51. Two schools of thought have 
developed with regard to the scope of Article 51: those who take the lit-
eral, or restrictive, approach and those who take the view that Article 51 
is considerably broader than its terms. 
1. The Restrictionist Approach 
The Restrictionist approach cites the absolute prohibition of forcible 
self-help, as set out in Article 2(4), subject only to the limited exception 
contained in Article 51.45 Under this reading, the exception permits re-
course to self-defence only when faced with actual “armed attack,” and 
Article 51 does not contemplate anticipatory or pre-emptive actions by a 
                                                                                                             
6. necessity arising from natural catastrophe; and 
7. measures to protect the lives or property of a state’s nationals in a foreign 
territory. 
 41. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 42. See, e.g., MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232–
41(1961). 
 43. Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law, supra note 31, at 25. 
 44. RUTH B. RUSSELL ASSISTED BY JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UN 
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1945, at 698–99 (1958). 
 45. JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 94–95 (1958). 
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state so threatened.46 Rather, it requires a state to refrain from responding 
with like force unless actively involved in repelling an armed attack.47 A 
significant number of writers argue that an armed attack is the exclusive 
circumstance in which the use of armed force is sanctioned under Article 
51.48 In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to state that “the lead-
ing opinion among scholars” is that the right of self-defence in Article 51 
does not extend beyond armed attack.49 Furthermore, the International 
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua Case clearly stated that the right of 
self-defence under Article 51 only accrues in the event of an armed at-
tack.50 Also, it is a traditional requirement of self-defence that a trigger-
ing event justifying a military response has already occurred or at least 
be imminent.51 
Restrictionists argue that by the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, 
“self-defense was understood to be justified only in case of an attack by 
the forces of a state.”52 Professor Brownlie notes that if Article 51 of the 
UN Charter is the authoritative definition of the right of self-defence and 
it is not qualified or supplemented by the customary law, then states are 
bound by the black-letter law of the Charter and have less extensive 
grounds to support armed force undertaken outside the framework of the 
UN Charter.53 
Though the Charter “may be regarded as objective or general interna-
tional law,”54 most recognized independent states have expressly ac-
cepted the principles and obligations of the Charter.55 Furthermore, the 
“provisions of the Charter have had strong influence on state practice 
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since 1945, and the terms of Article 51 or very similar terms, have ap-
peared in several important multilateral treaties and draft instruments.”56 
2. The Counter-Restrictionist Approach 
The Counter-Restrictionist approach adopts an expansionist view. Pro-
ponents interpret the Charter to recognize and include those rights of 
self-defence that existed under customary international law prior to its 
drafting.57 Oliver Schacter concisely states this position thus: 
On one reading [of Article 51] this means that self-defense is limited to 
cases of armed attack. An alternative reading holds that since the article 
is silent as to the right of self-defense under customary law (which goes 
beyond cases of armed attack), it should not be construed by implica-
tion to eliminate that right . . . . It is therefore not implausible to inter-
pret Article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defense as it ex-
isted prior to the Charter.58 
Customary law traditionally recognized a limited right of pre-emptive 
self-defence according to the “Caroline criteria”:59 the necessity of self-
defence “must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment of deliberation” and the action taken must not be “unrea-
sonable or excessive.”60 Martti Koskenniemi notes that the right of self-
defence articulated in the UN Charter “should be read rationally against 
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some useful purpose that the rule serves . . . .”61 Koskenniemi argues that 
the purpose of Article 51 was “to protect the sovereignty and the inde-
pendence of the state,”62 and that if a state feels its sovereignty and inde-
pendence threatened by the actions of another country, it might be enti-
tled to use force against that country, even if the country’s hostile actions 
had not yet risen to the level of an actual armed attack.63 Counter-
Restrictionist advocates hold the view that Article 2(4) left the right of 
self-defence unimpaired and that the right implicitly accepted was not 
confined to reaction to “armed attack” within Article 51 but permitted 
the protection of certain substantive rights: 
Action undertaken for the purpose of, and limited to, the defense of a 
state’s political independence, territorial integrity, the lives and prop-
erty of its nationals (and even to protect its economic independence) 
cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force “against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence” of any other state.64 
In line with Counter-Restrictionist proponents, it can be said that apart 
from the restrictive phrases in Article 2(4), Article 51 and Article 2(4) 
were not intended to, and do not, restrict the right of member states to 
use force in self-defence as defined by customary international law. Ac-
cording to this position, Article 51 refers merely to “armed attack” be-
cause it was inserted for the particular purpose of clarifying the position 
of defence treaties which are concerned only with external attack.65 
Therefore, despite apparent specificity, the Charter leaves the broader 
customary right, which is always implicitly reserved, intact. 
3. Anticipatory Self-Defence 
Contrary to the permissive and expansive reading of the Charter by 
some scholars, international opinion on the impermissibility of anticipa-
tory self-defence was never clearer than Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq.66 
Fearing that it might eventually be a target of Iraq’s efforts to develop 
nuclear weaponry, Israel reduced Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to rub-
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ble.67 Israel argued vehemently that the attack was justified based on the 
right of anticipatory self-defence.68 The world was outraged and rose up 
in one voice to condemn the act. 
The world was outraged by Israel’s raid on June 7 1981. “Armed attack 
in such circumstances cannot be justified. It represents a grave breach 
of international law,” Margaret Thatcher thundered. Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
the U.S. ambassador to the UN and as stern a lecturer as Britain’s then 
prime minister, described it as “shocking” and compared it to the So-
viet invasion of Afghanistan. American newspapers were as fulsome. 
“Israel’s sneak attack . . . was an act of inexcusable and shortsighted 
aggression,” said the New York Times. The Los Angeles Times called it 
“state-sponsored terrorism”. 
The greatest anger erupted at the UN. Israel claimed Saddam Hussein 
was trying to develop nuclear weapons and it was acting in self-
defense, which is legal under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Other coun-
tries did not agree. They saw no evidence that Iraq’s nuclear energy 
programme, then in its infancy and certified by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency as peaceful, could be described as military, ag-
gressive or directed against a particular country. In any case, pre-
emptive action by one country against another country which offers no 
imminent threat is illegal.69 
The Security Council condemned Israel’s bombing of the Osirak reac-
tor and unanimously passed Resolution 487, strongly denouncing the 
Israeli action as illegal.70 In addition to condemning the attack, the 
United States, under the authority of the Arms Control Act of 1968, sus-
pended arms shipments to Israel on the grounds that those arms were to 
be used for defensive purposes only.71 Invoking the standards of custom-
ary international law in general, and the Caroline factors in particular, 
the international community’s opposition to the bombing as self-defence 
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was based on the fact that the Iraqi threats, as well as their construction 
of the reactor, did not amount to an “armed attack” on Israel.72 
Politicians, policymakers, and the world at large were unanimous in 
sensing that Israel’s pre-emptive strike was taking the world down a 
slippery slope.73 If pre-emption was accepted as legal, the fragile struc-
ture of international peace would be undermined. Any state could attack 
another under the pretext that it detected a threat, however distant. Not-
withstanding the clear position taken by the Security Council and the 
international community, the parameters of a state’s “inherent” right to 
defend against armed attack is far from settled. 
C. Reprisals and the UN Charter 
In the heyday of anticipatory self-defence, states dealt with each other 
on the basis of reciprocity.74 There were no supranational institutions to 
make or enforce international law. States had the right to retaliate against 
states that failed to honor bilateral or multilateral arrangements through 
use of reprisals (retaliation by force) in ways that would otherwise have 
been considered illegal. “In the absence of a supranational authority, this 
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form of self-help was a way for states to get compensation for their 
losses, punish their offenders, and deter future violations.”75 
The purpose of international bodies such as the League of Nations and 
the United Nations was to limit this use of force, and to provide a forum 
for the resolution of conflict in international matters so as to prevent the 
need for war. The text of the UN Charter reflects this intent and repre-
sents a conventional rejection of the just war theories of retribution; to 
permit reprisals would thwart the very goal to which states have commit-
ted themselves by membership in the United Nations.76 
Many commentators believe retaliation and reprisals to be illegal under 
the UN Charter, citing the specific language of Articles 2 and 51.77 
Taken together, Articles 2 and 51 comprise a minimum order in the sense 
that they protect only the primary interest in freedom from aggression 
and the right of self-defence.78 “The provisions of the Charter relating to 
the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-resort to the use of force are 
universally regarded as prohibiting reprisals which involve the use of 
force.”79 These authorities conclude that the UN Charter requires states 
to settle disputes peacefully under Article 2(3) and prohibits all forms of 
forcible self-help other than the exercise of self-defence within the mean-
ing of Article 51. 
The Security Council expressed its view of the status of reprisals in 
1964 when it censured Great Britain for carrying out a reprisal against 
the Yemeni town of Harib in retaliation for alleged Yemeni support of 
the anti-colonial struggle in Aden.80 After several Yemeni attacks on the 
South Arabian Federation, the British commenced air attacks on Yemen 
in 1964.81 The United Kingdom Representative, after discussing the se-
ries of Yemeni attacks, stated: 
                                                                                                             
 75. Stéphanie Giry, New World, Old Law: Would a Unilateral Strike Against Iraq 
Ever Have Been Legal?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./ Feb. 2003, at 21. 
 76. See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-
Defence and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 243, 286 (1987). In the 
case of Israel, however, the United States has sometimes insisted, before condemning a 
reprisal by Israel, that the terrorist act that prompted the reprisal also be condemned. Wil-
liam V. O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence, and Self-Defence in Counterterror Operations, 
30 VA. J. INT’L L. 421, 433 (1990). 
 77. Roberts, supra note 76, at 282. 
 78. MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 42, at 121–24. 
 79. BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 281. 
 80. Lohr, supra note 49, at 32. 
 81. Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 8 (1972). 
2006] WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE 421 
 
It will also be abundantly plain that, contrary to what a number of 
speakers have said or implied, this action was not retaliation or a repri-
sal . . . . There is, in existing law, a clear distinction to be drawn be-
tween two forms of self-help. One, which is of a retributive or punitive 
nature, is termed “retaliation” or “reprisals;” the other, which is ex-
pressly contemplated and authorized by the Charter, is self-defense 
against armed attack . . . it is clear that the use of armed force to repel 
or prevent an attack—i.e. legitimate action of a defensive nature—may 
sometimes have to take the form of a counter-attack.82 
Despite the United Kingdom Representative’s delicate attempt to cloak 
the reprisals in the acceptable language of self-defence, the Security 
Council refused to be hoodwinked, denounced the actions as reprisals,  
and “deplore[d]” the British action.83 By a vote of 9-0, with two absten-
tions, the Security Council determined that it “[c]ondemns reprisals as 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”84 
The Council’s rationale was that the members of the United Nations con-
tracted not to use force to achieve solutions to international controver-
sies.85 A reprisal, not considered as the use of force in self-defence, was, 
therefore, considered an illegal use of force.86 Clearly the Security Coun-
cil took the dominant restrictionist view in international law in rejecting 
the legitimacy of any reprisal or anticipatory self-defence. 
“This de jure prohibition on reprisal found its way into documentary 
form in 1970”87 when the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accor-
dance with the UN Charter was adopted.88 The Declaration on Friendly 
Relations tenor was emphatic that members of the United Nations have 
legally renounced the use of peacetime reprisals.89 The first principle 
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provides that “[s]tates shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations.”90 One of the duties imposed under this 
principle is to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.91 
On its face, the Declaration on Friendly Relations seems to flatly reject 
the use of reprisals under all circumstances. This assertion is borne out 
by subsequent condemnations of reprisals by the international commu-
nity. In 1972, in reaction to constant terrorist attacks by Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) elements based in neighboring Lebanon, it re-
minded and in the same breath warned Lebanon that it had an interna-
tional legal obligation to prevent its territory from being used as a base 
for armed attacks against Israel by the PLO.92 A few weeks later on Feb-
ruary 25, 1972, Israel sent forces, tanks, armored cars, heavy artillery, 
and air support into Lebanon to attack PLO bases.93 In response, the Se-
curity Council issued Resolution 313. When debating Resolution 313, 
France denounced “these intolerable reprisals.”94 The final Resolution 
did not mince words demanding “that Israel immediately desist and re-
frain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and forth-
with withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese territory.”95 Israel 
adopted a blasé attitude towards this Resolution and was soon back in 
Lebanon attacking PLO bases. The Security Council was once again 
seized of the matter. Belgium stated that “[t]he Belgian Government has 
never ceased to repudiate energetically the military reprisal actions un-
dertaken by Israel against Lebanon.”96 The final Resolution of June 26, 
1972 denounced Israel’s actions as violating the UN Charter.97 
About a decade later, on December 27, 1985, simultaneous bombings 
of airline offices in Rome and Vienna left twenty innocent people dead, 
including five Americans, with over eighty people injured.98 Four months 
later on April 5, 1986, a bomb explosion in a West German discotheque 
frequented by American servicemen killed two American servicemen 
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and wounded 154 persons—fifty to sixty were Americans.99 In both in-
stances, intelligence traced the perpetrators back to Libya. In the early 
hours of April 15, 1986, U.S. Air Force and Naval aircraft simultane-
ously bombed targets in Libya. Despite the positive reaction from the 
U.S. Congress,100 both the Security Council and General Assembly con-
demned the U.S. attacks. While the Resolution to condemn the attack by 
the Security Council failed owing to vetoes by the United States, United 
Kingdom, and France, the vote in the General Assembly was successful. 
However, the clear stance of the international community on the legal-
ity of reprisals wavered in the late 1980s. Beginning in July 1987, during 
the course of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States conducted escort op-
erations of tankers in the Gulf. After months of volatility and gunboat 
diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, on April 14, 1988 Iranian submarine 
mines damaged a U.S. naval ship. Four days later, the United States re-
taliated with attacks that decimated two Iranian oil platforms.101 The next 
day, President Reagan stated that the United States’ action was “to make 
certain the Iranians have no illusions about the cost of irresponsible be-
havior.”102 The Reagan administration claimed the strike was in “retalia-
tion”103 for mine laying by Iran and that “any further mining by Iran 
would bring harsher military reprisals.”104 In this instance: 
There was no Security Council debate on these hostilities. In some 
cases, the U.S. forces clearly acted in self-defense. In other cases, as in 
the retaliatory strikes of October 19, 1987 and April 18, 1988, U.S. at-
tacks were not immediate. These actions could easily be characterized 
as preventive, deterrent measures and, just as readily, as punitive meas-
ures.105 
The seeming indifference by the United Nations in this instance, but-
tressed by other subsequent incidents, forms the basis of the view that the 
Charter does not prohibit reprisals entirely. In the late 1980s, the General 
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Assembly and the Security Council appear to have adopted a policy in-
consistent with their spoken opposition to reprisals.106 The Council has 
generally not condemned acts of reprisal which it considered “reason-
able,” while voting to condemn actions considered excessive or dispro-
portionate.107 In so doing, the Council has appeared to indicate its toler-
ance of some proportional acts of reprisal. As one scholar observes: 
There is, however, a contrary view that the Charter does not prohibit 
forcible self-help, i.e., reprisals entirely. An argument can be made that 
resorts to reprisals are both legal and desirable under the Charter. First, 
Security Council practice implies the recognition of the legitimacy of 
some type of reasonable reprisal. There is an inconsistency between the 
Security Council’s alleged principle of the illegality of all armed repri-
sals and the Council’s practice in not condemning a particular reprisal 
because it appeared reasonable. A practice of condemning only unrea-
sonable or disproportionate reprisals is, in effect, an affirmation of the 
right of states to resort to reasonable reprisals.108 
Therefore, under recent UN practices, the status of reprisals may be 
viewed as illegal de jure but accepted de facto, provided they meet the 
requirement of proportionality. The troubling question of whether any 
other forcible form of self-help outside of self-defence is permitted under 
the Charter thus persists.109 
Having canvassed the various avenues regarding the use of force, the 
author resists the temptation to move straight to the matter of the use of 
force and terrorism without addressing the controversial issue of humani-
tarian intervention. Though this does not strike a direct chord with the 
central theme of the Article, the most explicit form of unilateral action in 
the post-UN Charter era without UN authority has been premised in large 
part on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Vestiges of this doc-
trine have an increasing resonance in the plethora of justifications for the 
unilateral decision by the United States at the head of the “Coalition of 
the Willing” to invade Iraq in 2003 without explicit UN authority.110 It is 
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therefore only appropriate that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
gets mention. 
D. Humanitarian Intervention and the UN Charter 
It is significant that under the UN Charter, the third explicit exception 
to the general prohibition on the use of force, found in Chapter VIII of 
the Charter, permits actions undertaken by “regional arrangements or 
agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security.”111 Significantly, this is not a carte 
blanche, since regional alliances may undertake any action in this regard 
that is “consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Na-
tions.”112 
In general, humanitarian intervention entails a unilateral or multilateral 
intervention by a foreign power in a third country in reaction to serious 
and systematic violations of human rights by the government. Prior to the 
twentieth century, a general custom and practice of humanitarian inter-
vention existed.113 The legal doctrine finds scholarly support as early as 
the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius wrote that “where [tyrants]  
. . . provoke their own people to despair and resistance by unheard of 
cruelties, having themselves abandoned all the laws of nature, they lose 
the rights of independent sovereigns, and can no longer claim the privi-
lege of the law of nations.”114 This historical doctrine is strengthened by 
an emerging notion of a duty to protect civilians that has its genesis in 
the horrors of post-World War II. 
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For almost the entire history of the UN, it has recognized that certain 
human rights violations are beyond the pale of state sovereignty and 
constitute a threat to peace and security. Consequently, proponents of 
humanitarian intervention argue that the UN has endorsed the notion 
that sovereignty is secondary in importance to the basic human right to 
life.115 
However, the matter of humanitarian intervention in the post-UN Char-
ter era was brought strongly to the fore with NATO’s reaction to the eth-
nic cleansing in Kosovo by Serbian forces.116 On March 24, 1999, with-
out the benefit of a UN Security Council resolution expressly authorizing 
military action, NATO began a seventy-eight day air campaign over the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).117 The Kosovo operation was 
preceded by months of diplomatic efforts to resolve the region’s prob-
lems peacefully. The United Nations, OSCE, NATO, and the United 
States all participated in a multitude of diplomatic moves aimed at curb-
ing the violence and reaching a political solution. “The legal debate over 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been posed as a tension be-
tween two competing principles: respect for the ‘territorial integrity’ and 
‘political independence’ of states and the guarantees for human rights      
. . . .”118 
Opponents of humanitarian intervention argue that the use of force 
against a sovereign state violates the most imperative international legal 
norms, not to mention the UN Charter.119 
The major argument against a legal doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion is that it would open the door to “pretextual” intervention . . . this 
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legal doctrine is founded in the custom and practice of states, and be-
cause it is so controversial, there has never been a universally accepted 
standard established for regulating and evaluating humanitarian inter-
ventions. Whatever standard exists is only that which can be drawn 
from the past practice of intervening states, and as such is vague and 
malleable.120 
Proponents of the doctrine argue that despite the general prohibition on 
the use of force encapsulated in the UN Charter, a legal doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention survives, embodied in the custom and practice of 
state actors in the international arena.121 This argument is based in large 
part on the fact that the United Nations was formed to prevent the use of 
force as a means of settling disputes and to protect universal human 
rights.122 “Some states have opted to use force as a means of last resort to 
prevent humanitarian tragedy, while at the same time seeking to establish 
a self-defense argument in order to avoid UN sanction.”123 Traction for 
this argument can also be found in the observation that the UN Charter 
not only permits intervention on humanitarian grounds, it requires it in 
cases of gross and systemic human rights abuses.124 Articles 55 and 56 of 
the UN Charter implore “[a]ll Members [to] pledge themselves to take 
joint action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of  
. . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all . . . .”125 
A key point that undermined NATO’s claims that the Kosovo action 
was a permissible use of force was the foggy and often incoherent 
grounds it provided as justification. Despite its seemingly humanitarian 
dimensions, the Kosovo action was not a textbook example of the doc-
trine, and was dressed up with other justifications at odds with the central 
ground of humanitarian intervention. Professor Julie Mertus notes: 
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NATO did not act only in the name of human rights. Instead, leaders of 
NATO countries offered a cafeteria of justifications for their actions. 
The Clinton Administration considered but refused to base its actions in 
Kosovo solely on humanitarian rights grounds. Instead, the Administra-
tion offered an array of justifications. Humanitarian concerns were 
rolled together with other factors: the need for regional stabilization, 
the stemming of refugee flows, and the need to protect NATO’s reputa-
tion.126 
Mertus goes on to note that “by failing to specify clearly the legal pa-
rameters of their actions, the NATO allies exposed themselves to criti-
cism suggesting that NATO was not operating under any legal grounds at 
all.” 127 Mertus follows this concern by noting that by failing to provide 
clear legal justifications for intervention on human rights grounds, hu-
man rights advocates opened themselves up to similar criticism that they 
were outside the law.  
As this part of the Article has shown, the vagueness and confusion of 
conceptual elements and malleable past precedent clouds the UN Charter 
regime on the use of force. Having canvassed the various avenues re-
garding the use of force, the Article now turns to consider the use of 
military force as a counter-measure against terrorism in view of the fact 
that it is generally held to be inconsistent with the UN Charter regime on 
the use of force. 
III. THE COLD WAR ERA: TERRORIST ACTION AND REACTION 
During the Cold War Era, increased terrorist attacks focused attention 
on the capabilities of elite forces trained for anti-terrorist operations. The 
1976 Israeli hostage rescue at Entebbe in the aftermath of the hijacking 
of Air France Flight 139 marked the opening salvo in the use of military 
force to counter terrorism.129 About three years later, on November 4, 
1979, a mob of Iranians seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking a 
large group of employees hostage and sparking the Iranian hostage crisis. 
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Five months later, the impotence of diplomatic efforts led the Carter ad-
ministration to order a rescue effort by helicopter, but the mission was 
aborted.130 In 1981, following the release of the Iranian Embassy hos-
tages, Reagan warned that when the rules of international behavior are 
violated, the U.S. policy would be one of “swift and effective retribu-
tion.”131 The Reagan administration was sending initial indications that a 
hard line, conceivably involving the use of military force, would be taken 
with terrorists in the future. 
Two years later on April 18, 1983, sixty-three people were killed and 
one hundred twenty were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb at-
tack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.132 Six months later, on Oc-
tober 23, 1983, in another terrorist attack, a large Mercedes truck ex-
ploded with such terrific force that the headquarters of the First Battal-
ion, Eighth Marine Regiment was instantly reduced to rubble with the 
loss of 242 Americans.133 The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for 
both attacks.134 The bombings precipitated renewed debate over whether 
U.S. military forces were adequately prepared to deal with terrorism and 
whether the United States would use force either in anticipation of, or in 
response to, terrorism. 
The Long Commission, in commenting upon the devastating attack on 
the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut, concluded: 
[S]tate sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of war-
fare and . . . adequate response to this increasing threat requires an ac-
tive national policy which seeks to deter attack or reduce its effective-
ness. The Commission further concludes that this policy needs to be 
supported by political and diplomatic actions and by a wide range of 
timely military response capabilities.135 
The Long Commission report proved to be a turning point for U.S. 
counter-terrorism policy. Despite definitional concerns and fundamental 
issues concerning the kind of responses the United States could lawfully 
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take within the rubric of international law, the United States had grown 
tired of attacks against its interests and citizens and soon formally em-
braced military force against terrorist violence. In opting to use force, the 
United States took the position that it was necessary to accept some risks 
to ensure that every terrorist success attracted the military might of the 
United States.136 From the position of the United States, deterrence was 
premised on terrorists fearing a forceful response from the victim state. 
A. New Frontiers on the Use of Force? Development of the Reagan and 
Shultz Doctrines 
On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed the National Security Deci-
sion Directive (NSDD), which assigned responsibility for developing 
strategies to counter terrorism and made clear that, while use of all the 
non-military options would be made, the United States was also prepared 
to respond within the parameters set by the law of armed conflict. De-
fense Department official Noel Koch explained that the NSDD “repre-
sent[ed] a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode 
to recognition that proactive steps [were] needed.”137 Significantly, the 
document incorporated some key elements: the United States has a re-
sponsibility to take protective measures whenever evidence arises that 
terrorism is about to be committed against U.S. interests; and the threat 
of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression and justifies acts in lawful 
self-defence.138 With this directive, the ground was formally laid for the 
“Reagan Doctrine” of swift, effective retribution. 
The NSDD signaled that, as far as the executive branch was concerned, 
the debate over whether military force was inside or outside the range of 
counter-terrorism measures was over. Henceforth, the United States 
would use military force in both pre-emptive and retaliatory scenarios. 
Although then U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz had initially advo-
cated only “an active defense” against terrorists,139 growing frustration 
over the inability of the United States to effectively counter the accelerat-
ing frequency and violence of terrorist attacks prompted him to re-
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evaluate his views on the nature of appropriate responses to international 
terrorism, further expanding the controversial new U.S. policy. 
In late 1984 at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City, Shultz 
asserted that the United States must be ready to use military force to fight 
terrorism and retaliate even before all the facts are known.140 This was 
the beginning of what later became known as the “Shultz Doctrine,” a 
corollary of the “Reagan Doctrine.” Shultz predicted that the increased 
terrorist attacks against strategic U.S. interests around the world in the 
years ahead would necessitate a willingness to combat it using military 
force.141 This signaled that an active policy of response by armed force to 
terrorist attacks would be followed by the United States. In the same 
speech, Shultz claimed a broad right on behalf of the United States to use 
force against terrorist threats abroad, including a policy of pre-emptive 
strikes in foreign countries.142 Although arguably effective and temporar-
ily satisfying, the important concern was whether a policy of armed re-
sponse was wise in view of its probable violation of international law. 
The United States ran the risk of incurring the massive condemnation 
that would accompany a policy of systematic use of armed force against 
terrorist attacks and the possibility of being branded an international out-
law.143 
Even as the “Reagan” and “Shultz Doctrines” were forming, Israeli ac-
tion was actively providing a practical manifestation of the tenet underly-
ing these doctrines with regular military actions to counter terrorism out-
side its territory—in Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia—throughout the 1980s. 
The U.S. position that “[a]s a matter of U.S. policy, retaliation against 
terrorist attacks is a legitimate response and an expression of self-
defense”144 was practically expressed in 1985 by Israel. On October 1, 
1985, six F-15 Israeli fighter-bombers unleashed a barrage of bombs on 
the headquarters of the PLO in a suburb of Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, 
responding to alleged terrorist attacks.145 Israel Defense Minister Yitzhak 
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Rabin seemed to echo Reagan and Shultz when he stated: “[w]e decided 
the time was right to deliver a blow to the headquarters of those who 
make the decisions, plan and carry out terrorist activities.”146 The UN 
Security Council was swift to vigorously condemn the act as a flagrant 
violation of the UN Charter, international law, and norms of conduct.147 
Three days after the attack, a single session of the Security Council pro-
duced Resolution 573 (with only one abstention by the United States), 
which condemned the Israeli attack; demanded that Israel “refrain from 
perpetrating such acts of aggression or from threatening to do so;” urged 
member states to “dissuade Israel from resorting to such acts;” and sup-
ported Tunisia’s right to reparations.148 
The international community in general condemned the Israeli Tunis 
raid as an act of aggression and a violation of Tunisia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.149 Israel’s argument of self-defence against terrorism 
was dismissed.150 Israel’s attack and the U.S.’s subsequent support in the 
face of vitriolic condemnation by most countries was symptomatic of the 
revolution in policy that the United States was undertaking. The United 
States abstained from the string of condemnations that followed every 
Israeli action debated in the Security Council, and began to veto consid-
eration of those resolutions, effectively ending discussion of the matter 
within the Security Council.151 This change in U.S. reaction was not just 
the result of a new, hawkish conservative administration; it was also a 
response to the targeting of U.S. citizens and interests by state-sponsored 
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terrorists. U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walter’s explanation of the U.S. ab-
stention in the Security Council Resolution condemning Israel’s bombing 
in Tunis is instructive: 
[W]e recognize and strongly support the principle that a state subjected 
to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of 
force to defend against further attacks. This is an aspect of the inherent 
right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations Charter.152 
Two months after the Israeli counter-terrorist attacks, the U.S. frustra-
tion with the international regime on the use of force in countering terror-
ism was captured clearly by Secretary of State Shultz’s outburst: 
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing 
terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the 
soil of other nations, even for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from 
using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or 
guerrillas. International law requires no such result.153 
With these words, Shultz laid down more building blocks for the 
“Shultz Doctrine” and its highly controversial position advocating the 
use of military force not only against terrorists, but also against states 
that support, train, or harbor terrorists.154 This Doctrine was formally 
fleshed out on January 15, 1986, in the Secretary’s speech on terrorism at 
the National Defense University.155 In that speech, the Secretary added: 
“a nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or pre-
empt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens, when no 
other means is available.”156 This is so, the Secretary said, even though 
others have “asserted that military action to retaliate or pre-empt terror-
ism is contrary to international law.”157 
Worldwide opposition to the new policy was swift in coming. Surpris-
ingly, even some senior officials in the U.S. State Department expressed 
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reservations.158 U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, in charge 
of the machinery that would be tasked with affecting the doctrine, op-
posed responsive military strikes that needlessly “kill women and chil-
dren.”159 Additionally, Robert Oakley, Ambassador-at-Large for Counter 
Terrorism, opined that the President’s Commission on Terrorism had 
recommended that the United States not use military force to retaliate 
against states supporting terrorists.160 International and domestic opposi-
tion in the United States was a result of a number of difficult issues 
raised by the doctrine, and the difficult questions raised by the United 
States’ new policy: 
[I]s the responding coercion still a use of force in self-defense against 
an armed “attack?” Is the responding coercion primarily pre-emptive, 
retaliatory, or for the purpose of imposing sanctions against a violation 
of international law? And if among the latter, are any of these forms of 
responsive coercion ever permissible?161 
The United States was determined not to back down, and a few weeks 
after Shultz had fleshed out his doctrine, the Vice President’s Task Force 
on Combating Terrorism found: “Terrorism has become another means 
of conducting foreign affairs. Such terrorists are agents whose associa-
tion the state can easily deny. Use of terrorism by the country entails few 
risks, and constitutes strong-arm, low-budget foreign policy.”162 This 
statement echoed the Reagan administration’s concerns over new and 
unconventional challenges to U.S. foreign policy in critical areas of the 
world. 
Though it was evident that this threat of low-intensity conflict raised a 
host of new legal, political, military, and moral issues, it was not long 
before the United States demonstrated that it was not overly concerned 
with the questions that its new policy engendered and that the “Reagan” 
and “Shultz Doctrines” were not just hollow rhetoric. On April 5, 1986, 
Le Belle discotheque in West Germany, a spot popular with off-duty 
American servicemen, was bombed, leaving two Americans dead and 
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over 154 persons injured.163 U.S. intelligence indicated Libya sponsored 
this terrorist attack.164 President Reagan responded to this threat by 
bombing military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya on April 14, 
1986.165 The attack was met with condemnation.166 Critics claimed the 
time lapse and proportionally of the attacks, as well as the choice of tar-
gets undermined the primary justification of self-defence.167 As Major 
Phillip A. Seymour notes: 
Although President Reagan cited self-defense under Article 51 of the 
UN Charter as the legal basis for the air strike, his explanation implic-
itly included retaliation (i.e., reprisal) as an additional justification . . . .  
In deciding to use military force against Libya, deterrence certainly was 
a major, if not the primary, consideration . . . . This interpretation is 
supported by then-Vice President George Bush’s comments a month 
prior to the Libyan raid when he stated that American policy in combat-
ing terrorism would be one of a willingness to “retaliate.”168 
The Tripoli bombing was far from a one off event; it was part of a 
crystallizing U.S. policy. This was despite the fact that international law 
relating to self-defence did not accord with the American viewpoint. The 
United States seemed determined to co-opt the use of military force 
against terrorism within the infirm concept of anticipatory self-defence. 
Two years after the air raid on Tripoli, on December 21, 1988, while 
cruising at an altitude of 31,000 feet, Pan American Flight 103 (Flight 
103) exploded in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland.169 Two hundred 
fifty-eight passengers and crew died in the explosion; another seventeen 
townspeople died on the ground as a result of the fiery debris.170 Presi-
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dent Reagan ordered an inquiry into the circumstances of the Flight 103 
disaster and directed the preparation of a report intended to be “a com-
prehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options with re-
spect to preventing terrorist acts involving aviation.”171 Among the rec-
ommendations of the President’s Commission were “active measures—
pre-emptive or retaliatory, direct or covert—against a series of targets in 
countries well-known to have engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.”172 
These recommendations reinforced the vitality of the “Reagan” and 
“Shultz Doctrines” as part of the U.S. policy of pre-emption. It was, 
however, not until the end of the Cold War that the United States had the 
opportunity to fully pursue this new national policy. 
IV. POST-COLD WAR: PROACTIVE ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM 
In 1993, following the discovery of an Iraqi plot to assassinate then 
U.S. President George Bush Sr. on a visit to Kuwait, the United States 
fired twenty-three cruise missiles at Iraqi intelligence targets within 
Iraq.173 Though the attack came after those involved in the plot in Kuwait 
had been apprehended and President Bush had completed his planned 
visit, the justification presented to Congress by the President was that the 
action was within the right of self-defence under Article 51.174 
The next significant case of American action to counter terrorism 
through military action came on August 7, 1998 when U.S. Embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania were bombed, killing at least 252 (including twelve 
U.S. citizens) and injuring more than five thousand. Secretary of State 
Albright pledged to “use all means at our disposal to track down and 
punish” those responsible.175 On August 20, 1998, the United States re-
sponded by launching seventy-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. 
warships.176 This attack was directed at an Osama bin Laden bankrolled 
Al Qaeda terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and a Sudanese pharma-
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ceutical plant177 that the Clinton administration suspected was producing 
chemical weapon components with bin Laden’s funding.178 
The American justification for their military action was based on both 
reprisal and anticipatory self-defence.179 In his address to the nation, then 
U.S. President Bill Clinton told the American people that the strikes 
against the “terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan” were 
necessary because of the “imminent threat they presented to [U.S.] na-
tional security.”180 Thus the Clinton administration, like the Reagan ad-
ministration before it, justified its response to terrorist strikes by claim-
ing self-defence. In a report sent to Congress, President Clinton claimed 
that the strikes were justified under the “inherent right of self-defense 
consistent with Article 51 . . .” and at the same time were intended to 
“prevent and deter additional attacks . . . .”181 Moreover, President Clin-
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ton invoked the traditional Caroline requirements of imminence, neces-
sity, and proportionality, claiming that all three had been met.182 Indeed, 
when Bill Richardson, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 
wrote the letter notifying the UN Security Council of the U.S. missile 
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, he clearly laid out the U.S. arguments 
in support of the attacks in the familiar language of self-defence.183 Clin-
ton’s Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, went further by warning 
terrorist organizations that the United States would not limit itself to 
“passive defense” when faced with choosing either to “fight or fold in 
pathetic cowardice . . . . ”184 
Many of the same critiques of the Reagan administration’s bombing of 
Libya in 1986 were lodged at the Clinton administration’s cruise missile 
attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan, and many observers concluded that 
the cruise missile attacks violated the rules of international law.185 In-
deed, one commentator suggested that the Clinton administration fore-
saw this criticism: “The care with which . . . President [Clinton] and U.S. 
officials characterized the justification for the missile attacks show[ed] 
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their concern that the actions of the United States could be perceived as a 
violation of international law.”186 
In characterizing the cruise missile strikes as “retaliation rather than 
legitimate self-defense,”187 critics took issue with the fact that the targets 
of the attacks in both Afghanistan and Sudan had no direct link to any 
“imminent” attack against the United States.188 Furthermore, it was 
unlikely that the destruction of the terrorist training camps in Afghani-
stan, and the leveling of the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, met the pro-
portionality requirement regulating uses of force in self-defence.189 Thus, 
no matter how the Clinton administration chose to justify the attacks—
whether as retaliation or as self-defence—the equation simply did not 
add up to an acceptable use of force under international law.190 Most no-
tably, 
this is the first time the U.S. has given such primary and public promi-
nence to the preemptive, not just retaliatory, nature and motive of a 
military strike against a terrorist organization or network. This may be 
signaling a more proactive and global counter-terrorism policy, less 
constrained in targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure.191 
In a warning to terrorist groups who may seek weapons of mass de-
struction, President Clinton cited past efforts by the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network to acquire chemical and other dangerous weapons as one of the 
reasons for the U.S. attack. The Clinton administration had not only de-
clared war on terror, but had also laid down the framework which the 
George W. Bush administration would take to the next level in the after-
math of the September 11th attacks. 
A. September 11, 2001: Crossing the Rubicon? 
In a coordinated operation, whose breadth and audacity stunned the 
world, terrorists believed to be part of the Al Qaeda network carried out 
the worst terrorist attack in modern times, targeting various symbols of 
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U.S. supremacy and leaving over three thousand people dead.192 The day 
after the attacks, the UN Security Council tersely stated that “[t]he mag-
nitude of [the] acts goes beyond terrorism as we have known it so far . . . 
. We therefore think that new definitions, terms and strategies have to be 
developed for the new realities.”193 On the same day, the UN General 
Assembly, at its first plenary meeting of the year, adopted Resolution 
56/1 without a vote, urgently calling for international cooperation to pre-
vent and eradicate acts of terrorism and stressing that those responsible 
for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers, and 
sponsors of such acts would be held accountable.194 
Nine days later, on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush 
pledged: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end 
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been 
found, stopped, and defeated.”195 The UN Security Council agreed with 
President Bush on the urgent need to fight terrorism.196 In addition, every 
major regional organization, including the Arab League, agreed that the 
September 11th hijackings and attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon were acts of terrorism in violation of international law.197 
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UN Security Resolution 1368, passed a day after the September 11th 
attacks, unequivocally condemned the attacks, calling on all states to 
“work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers 
and sponsors”198 of the attacks, and thus reaffirmed the inherent right of 
self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.199 The 
U.S. right of self-defence was often mentioned in the same breath as the 
terrorist attacks. “Given the circumstances, this affirmation was signifi-
cant: it implied that the attacks triggered the right even if, at the time of 
adoption, the UN Security Council knew almost nothing about who or 
what had launched them.”200 
The shift in the law of pre-emption was evident. The international re-
sponse to retaliatory military strikes made by Israel against Tunisia in 
1985 had been strongly condemnatory, despite Israel’s argument that 
Tunisia’s acts of harboring, supplying, and assisting non-state actors who 
they claimed committed terrorist acts in Israel should be sufficient to at-
tribute the acts to the state.201 Notwithstanding Israel’s claims of self-
defence, in Resolution 573 the Security Council condemned the 1985 air 
attack on PLO headquarters as an “act of armed aggression . . . in fla-
grant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law 
and norms of conduct.”202 The fact that Resolution 573 condemned Is-
rael’s attack as contrary to the UN Charter implied that no justification 
based on self-defence was recognized. Subsequently, the claim of self-
defence was also rejected by states as justification for the U.S. bombing 
of Tripoli and the 1993 bombing of the Iraqi Secret Service.203 The inter-
national response to the September 11th attack was an important depar-
ture from the reasoning in Resolution 573. 
Amidst a swell of international support, the United States quickly iden-
tified the Al Qaeda terrorist network, with the support of the Taliban 
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government, as the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks.204 This 
was coupled with the recognition that the modern threat to U.S. power 
and security rises not from one particular organization, but from the 
growing threat of international terrorism, particularly terrorism that en-
joys active or tacit state support.205 The Security Council’s resolutions 
following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan explicitly mention the right of 
individual and collective self-defence and do not contain any condemna-
tion of the military strikes.206 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan signaled a renewed de-
termination on the part of the United States to combat international ter-
rorism and states that sponsor it; the operation laid fertile ground for de-
bate on the strategic or legal approach that states should adopt in re-
sponding to such threats. Strategically, the U.S. military action was based 
on the “Reagan Doctrine” of swift and effective retribution against ter-
rorist organizations that strike U.S. interests,207 as well as the “Shultz 
Doctrine” of active military engagement of terrorists and states that 
sponsor or support them. Though legally the U.S. justified “Operation 
Enduring Freedom” under the established doctrine of self-defence,208 talk 
from Washington suggested pre-emptive self-defence. 
Essentially, the United States did not consider military action against 
Afghanistan as a formal war against the state but pre-emption of further 
attacks by terrorists based in that state. As the United States moved 
against Afghanistan, the highest levels of military, legal, and diplomatic 
policymakers in Washington began debating how the country should 
confront states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of mass 
destruction. The immediate focus of the debate was U.S. policy towards 
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Iraq. Soon after the military action in Afghanistan, President Bush pro-
voked heated reaction with his “Axis of Evil” speech209 and its strong 
overtones of the use of unilateral military action by the United States 
against countries that support terror, and an intimation of expanding the 
theatre of operations beyond Afghanistan without Security Council ap-
proval. 210 
B. The “Bush Doctrine” 
Though the genesis of the “Bush Doctrine” can be traced to the imme-
diate aftermath of the September 11th attacks,211 it was five months after 
the “Axis of Evil” speech, on June 1, 2001, that President Bush delivered 
the fullest exposition of the doctrine in a speech at West Point.212 Warn-
ing that the United States faced “a threat with no precedent” through the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of global 
terrorism, President Bush stated that the traditional strategies of deter-
rence and containment were no longer sufficient.213 Because of the new 
threats that the United States faced, he claimed that a proper understand-
ing of the right of self-defence would now extend to authorizing pre-
emptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting them off before they 
are able to launch devastating strikes.214 Under these circumstances, he 
concluded that “[i]f we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have 
waited too long.”215 Expounding on the strategic aspect of the doctrine, 
President Bush stated that there was a need to “take the battle to the en-
emy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they 
emerge.”216 In the same address, he went on to tell future U.S. military 
officers at West Point that “[t]he military must be ready to strike at a 
moment’s notice in any dark corner of the world. All nations that decide 
for aggression and terror will pay a price.”217 That doctrine carried an 
explicit warning for Iraq and other states that pursue weapons of mass 
destruction: if a hostile regime pursues the acquisition or development of 
                                                                                                             
 209. George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Nine days after the attacks, U.S. President George Bush announced the new ag-
gressive national policy towards terrorism. See Response, supra note 195, at 1141–42. 
 212. See West Point Commencement Address, supra note 16. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
444 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 31:2 
 
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, the decisive use of pre-emptive 
military force is a legitimate response. 
President Bush spent months building the case for war against Iraq, 
however his justifications were often confusing and long on rhetoric but 
short on substance. His primary argument, however, invoked a sweeping 
new foreign policy based on the right of the United States to pre-emptive 
self-defence, the need to punish Iraq for not complying with the Security 
Council resolutions to which it had agreed in exchange for an end to the 
Gulf War, and the need for massive retaliation.218 President Bush seemed 
unsure of the exact contours of his doctrine, tying up pre-emptive strikes 
with retaliation (which the author avers falls under the rubric of peace 
time reprisal).  
The National Security Strategy document, issued by President Bush in 
September 2002, asserted: 
Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—
means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or 
citizen to defend . . . . Containment is not possible when unbalanced 
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons 
or missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies . . . . If we wait for 
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited for too long . . . . In the 
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. 
And this nation will act.219 
Though the more modest argument of retaliation may have been the 
strongest, the U.S. response was increasingly articulated more firmly in 
favor of anticipatory self-defence: 
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer 
an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves 
against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal schol-
ars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-
emption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible 
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack . . . .  
The U.S. has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to 
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the 
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncer-
tainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To fore-
                                                                                                             
 218. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations 
General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002); George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President 
(Apr. 13, 2004). 
 219. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 16, at 15 (emphasis added). 
2006] WALKING AN INTERNATIONAL LAW TIGHTROPE 445 
 
stall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the U.S. will, if 
necessary, act pre-emptively.220 
The National Security Strategy document referred to the longstanding 
policy as an option, not a principle.221 Interestingly though, the UN Char-
ter, the centre point of the legal framework on the international use of 
force, was not mentioned, and no attempt was made to anchor the formal 
articulation of the option within the umbrella of the Charter. 
Despite the United States’ maneuverings while formulating a post-
September 11th security strategy, it had Iraq firmly in its sights. The 
United States and its allies continued to put forward what even then was 
regarded by many as faulty intelligence,222 in an attempt to link Iraq to 
the September 11th attacks.223 Before the war, despite international and 
domestic skepticism, the hawkish Bush administration had already de-
cided that the tragic events of September 11th had altered the context of 
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the United States-Iraq confrontation.224 The resulting U.S. shift to an ag-
gressive Iraq policy forced it to advance rather dubious legal justifica-
tions for a full-scale invasion. Relying on the multifaceted “Bush Doc-
trine,” the policy advocates pre-emptive or preventive strikes against ter-
rorists, states that support terrorists, and hostile states possessing weap-
ons of mass destruction. 
The United States’ new aggressive anti-terror campaign began with 
multilateral condemnation of terrorism. The United States and the United 
Kingdom successfully encouraged the UN Security Council to pass 
Resolution 1441,225 which gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with 
its disarmament obligations through weapons inspections. Impatient with 
the slow pace of the UN weapons inspection process, the United States 
soon assumed that Iraqi was involved in terrorist activity and that Iraqi 
capacity for weapons of mass destruction persisted.226 
The U.S. national security officials were adamant in their commitment 
to act fast and to act alone and increasingly balked at UN control over the 
use of force against rogue states that present perceived security threats.227 
The end-game of this debate was cemented by President Bush when he 
announced that “the policy of [the U.S.] government is the removal of 
Saddam [Hussein].”228 This announcement effectively cut off all future 
multilateral activities with the UN. 
Possibly, in light of the dubious intelligence linking Iraq to the Sep-
tember 11th attacks, the United States cited Iraq’s capacity to use weap-
ons of mass destruction as an additional justification for self-defensive 
anticipatory intervention against Iraq.229 Self-defence, it was suggested, 
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also fueled the need for internal “regime change” in Iraq and U.S. sup-
port of such change.230 In March 2003, without waiting for the UN Secu-
rity Council to declare Iraq in breach of Resolution 1441 and, thus, a 
threat to international peace and security for which the Council could 
explicitly authorize military intervention,231 the United States and its al-
lies proceeded with military action against Iraq premised on pre-emptive 
or anticipatory self-defence. The technologically superior U.S. army 
waged a highly-organized, technical “shock and awe” campaign that im-
pressed an otherwise angry international community, and drove Saddam 
Hussein out of power.232 The war against Iraq was to be the defining 
moment in the evolution of the “Bush Doctrine,” marking a growing co-
herence and confidence in the strategy of “offensive defense.” 
Despite the United States’ focus on pre-emptive intervention, the ac-
tion against Iraq and the United States’ subsequent occupation was un-
dertaken against a background of vehement opposition from a large sec-
tion of the international community, including some major powers.233 If 
Afghanistan had set the stage for the evolution of anticipatory self-
defence, the overbreadth of the U.S. action in Iraq action dismantled it. 
The regime on force does not support the operationalisation of pre-
emptive self-defence against Iraq as it did in Afghanistan, and the cir-
cumstances surrounding U.S. intervention in Iraq differ fundamentally 
from those in Afghanistan. The United States did not conclusively prove 
that Al Qaeda maintained Iraqi training bases or that it received financial, 
logistic, or military support from the Iraqi government.234 The strategic 
and legal calculus for action in Iraq did not compare favorably to that 
which motivated U.S. action in Afghanistan in late 2001. Unlike the 
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questionable connection between Iraq and the September 11th attacks, 
there were clear ties between the terrorists involved in the U.S. attacks 
and the government of Afghanistan.235 
Not surprisingly, military action against Iraq has split the international 
community and inflamed the world’s major powers, as it raises both pol-
icy and legal matters. Considering that the use of armed force can only 
be justified under the international law regime when used in self-defence, 
can the United States go beyond the rhetoric and actually carry the war 
on terror to those rogue nations who are identified as supporters and 
sponsors of terrorist activities, but have not physically engaged in an act 
of aggression against the United States?236 The convergence of interna-
tional terrorism and weapons of mass destruction presents a grave threat 
to international peace, security, and prosperity by threatening the sur-
vival of entire nations. This threat multiplies exponentially when gov-
ernments foster and encourage these dual scourges. However, the aggres-
sive “Bush Doctrine” is disturbing because an old problem in contempo-
rary international law (anticipatory self-defence) is being touted as a 
newly appropriate vehicle in the war against international terrorism, de-
spite the prevailing view in the international community that the “armed 
attack” requirement in Article 51 of the UN Charter superseded any pre-
existing right of anticipatory action. 
The old truism that “international law is not a suicide pact,” may be 
forceful in “an age of uniquely destructive weaponry,”237 however, “stra-
tegically, there is little precedent for a major U.S. military offensive 
against a state that has not proximately used force against [the United 
States].”238 While a number of legitimate justifications might permit the 
use of force, the international legal system does not currently provide a 
legal outlet for such force.239 “An international law doctrine, under which 
the [United States] could execute the military campaign it successfully 
launched against Iraq, does not currently exist. That lacuna was seem-
ingly plugged with the ‘Bush Doctrine,’ that advocates pre-emptive 
strikes against rogue states and/or entities involved in terrorism.”240 The 
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Doctrine’s reliance on the premise of pre-emptive self-defence resurrects 
the idea of a “right of self-preservation” that fell into disuse in the early 
part of the twentieth century with the prohibition of war and the legal 
demarcation of the limits of the right to self-defence outlined in the UN 
Charter.241 
C. Reflections on the Use of Force as a Counter-Terrorism Measure in 
Light of the UN Charter 
1. Armed Attack and Self-Defence 
Contrary to the intentions of the authors of the UN Charter, the system 
of collective security has been of little practical significance, and state 
aggression continues to be determined by the unilateral use of force by 
states.242 Commentators argue that, because the customary right of self-
defence includes action beyond armed attack, military force may be le-
gally available as an option against terrorists, even if an armed attack has 
not occurred.243 
This view holds that the presence of an armed attack is one of the bases 
for the exercise of the right of self-defence under Article 51, but not the 
exclusive basis.244 The sentiments of these commentators are also re-
flected by some major states.245 In support of such an expansive interpre-
tation of “armed attack,” certain international legal scholars “believe that 
state sponsorship and support of international terrorists constitutes a use 
of force contemplated by Article 2(4).”246 This is not an entirely idle ar-
gument considering that the scope and content of the prohibition of the 
use of force in contemporary international law cannot be determined by 
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an interpretation of Article 2(4) alone. Rather, the provision must be read 
in context with Articles 39, 51, and 53. These articles contain a number 
of terms that, though related to one another, differ considerably in their 
meaning. Thus notions such as “use or threat of force,” “threat to the 
peace,” “breach of the peace,” “act of aggression,” “armed attack” and 
“aggressive policy” are used but do not receive any further explanation 
in the Charter.247 Neither legal writing nor state practice has clarified 
these terms beyond doubt. Nor have attempts within the framework of 
the United Nations led to a satisfactory interpretation. Therefore, there is 
still no sound basis for redefining the Charter’s prohibition of the use of 
force. 
State practice (albeit restricted to only a few states, notably the United 
States and Israel) seems to support the view that terrorist bombings may 
constitute an armed attack justifying self-defence under Article 51. For 
example, the United States justified its cruise missile attack against Su-
dan and Afghanistan following the 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as an exercise of self-defence.248 The 
United States has considered terrorist bombings to be armed attacks for 
some time and has accordingly justified several U.S. military actions 
against states that have supported terrorists.249 
It is significant that the Security Council characterized the terrorist acts 
as “armed attacks.” 
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, it is also neces-
sary to ask whether the concept of “armed attack” in Article 51 of the 
Charter is capable of including a terrorist attack . . . . There is, however, 
no a priori reason why the term should be so confined. There is no 
doubt that terrorist acts by a state can constitute an armed attack and 
thereby justify a military response. The UN General Assembly included 
certain types of terrorist activity committed by states in its definition of 
aggression in 1974. Similarly, the International Court of Justice, in its 
judgment in the Nicaragua case in 1986, considered that covert military 
action by a state could be classified as an armed attack if it was of suf-
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ficient gravity. The level of violence employed on September 11, 2001 
undoubtedly reached that level of gravity.250 
This view was expressly affirmed by other international bodies includ-
ing NATO and the OAS.251 This characterization may lead one to con-
clude that: 
The international reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 confirms 
the commonsense view that the concept of armed attack is not limited 
to state acts. The UN Security Council, in its resolutions 1368 and 1373 
(2001), adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, expressly 
recognized the right of self-defense in terms that could only mean it 
considered that terrorist attacks constituted armed attacks for the pur-
poses of Article 51 of the Charter, since it was already likely, when 
these resolutions were adopted, that the attacks were the work of a ter-
rorist organization rather than a state.252 
By recognizing the “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence” in the preambles of Resolution 1368 and Resolution 1373, the 
Security Council acknowledged that self-defence motivated the military 
strikes against the Taliban in 2001. 253 
Nothing in the language of Article 39 or the rest of the Charter suggests 
that only threats emanating from states can fall within its scope. In re-
cent years, the Security Council has had no hesitation in treating acts of 
international terrorism, whether or not “state-sponsored,” as threats to 
the peace for the purposes of Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus, even be-
fore September 11, 2001, the Council had characterized as a threat to 
international peace and security Libyan support for terrorism . . . .254 
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The main question is how the events of September 11th affect the in-
terpretation of the “armed attack” requirement under the UN Charter. 
Despite the assertion above, in the author’s view, the Security Council’s 
statement implies that the difficult question of whether the terrorist at-
tacks constituted “armed attacks” depends on interpretation. As this au-
thor has noted: 
Resolution 1368 is ambiguous on the issue. In its preamble, Resolution 
1368 “recogni[ses] the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense in accordance with the Charter,” but in the operative part of the 
resolution describes the attacks as “terrorist attacks” (not armed at-
tacks) that “represent a threat to international peace and security.” In 
summary, Resolution 1368 . . . does not explicitly recognise that the 
right of self-defense applies in relation to any parties as a consequence 
of the September 11 attacks.255 
Even if the right of self-defence extends beyond the “armed attack” of 
Article 51, serious hurdles must be overcome before a traditional theory 
of self-defence can be used to justify attacks against terrorists or terrorist 
facilities located in another state. If the anticipated action by terrorists is 
not sufficiently imminent, the right to use force is not available for pur-
poses of deterrence.256 Some argue that even if the right of self-defence 
extends beyond the “armed attack” requirement of Article 51, the UN 
Charter would not permit the use of force to punish an aggressor after a 
threat had passed, nor permit the use of force to deter a less than immi-
nent threat.257 In any case, 
if past terrorist actions by a group are too remote in time, the response 
by force is likely to be characterized as an illegal reprisal. It appears 
that if a right to use force in self-defense exists apart from an armed at-
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tack, it is a right that presents a very narrow window of opportunity. In 
fact, this window of opportunity, under the traditional criteria for self-
defense, will almost never exist in the context of terrorist attacks. The 
traditional requirements for self-defense are simply too restrictive to 
reasonably respond to the threat posed by international terrorism.258 
2. Pre-emptive Self-Defence 
Under customary international law, the right of self-defence was 
judged by the standard first set out in the 1837 case of the Caroline, 
which established the right of a state to take necessary and proportional 
actions in anticipation of a hostile threat.259 Based on the Caroline inci-
dent, anticipatory self-defence must be “necessary,” “proportional,” and 
take place “immediately.”260 As noted elsewhere in this Article, Article 
51 of the UN Charter is generally taken as an authoritative definition of 
the right of self-defence. However, scholars and states alike have contin-
ued to debate whether the enactment of Article 51 subsumed customary 
international law and extinguished the concept of anticipatory self-
defence, or whether it simply codified a right that continues to exist with 
all its attendant doctrines under customary international law. The answer 
is in the interpretation. 
Proponents of the continuing customary right to pre-emptive self-
defence have cited the impracticability of applying a literal interpretation 
of Article 51 in an age of advanced weapons, delivery systems, and 
heightened worldwide terrorist activity.261 Adherents argue the absurdity 
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of requiring a state to refrain from taking action on its own behalf when 
an opposing state is preparing to launch an attack.262 Given the devastat-
ing potential of modern weapons and the swiftness of delivery to their 
intended targets, denying a state the right to act in advance of a pending 
attack effectively denies any defence at all. The same rationale applies to 
states threatened with impending terrorist attacks on their citizenry or 
property. 
Some scholars have noted that it cannot be supposed that the inviola-
bility of territory is so sacrosanct as to mean that a state may harbor 
within its territory the most blatant preparation for an assault upon an-
other state’s independence with impunity; the inviolability of territory is 
subject to the use of that territory in a manner which does not involve a 
threat to the rights of other states.263 Further supporting this position is 
that there is no literal requirement under Article 51 that a foreign gov-
ernment itself directly undertake the attack to which a state responds. 
Thus, the harboring of terrorists may give rise to legitimate, legal justifi-
cation for anticipatory military intervention. Any such claim, however, is 
still fundamentally one of self-defence, and still restricted by threshold 
requirements, including imminence, necessity, and proportionality.264 
Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that a right of truly antici-
patory self-defence has emerged outside of Article 51, based not on pre-
existing customary law, but on the availability of weapons capable of 
mass destruction.265 Thomas Franck accounts for the emergence of a vi-
able doctrine of anticipatory self-defence through 
the transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and in-
stant destruction. These [weapons] brought into question the condition-
ality of Article 51, which limits states’ exercise of the right of self-
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defense to the aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first strike ca-
pabilities begat a doctrine of “anticipatory self-defense” . . . . 266 
Other scholars opine that in a nuclear age, there are potentially devas-
tating consequences for prohibiting self-defence unless an armed attack 
has already occurred, leading states to prefer the interpretation permitting 
anticipatory self-defence.267 Christopher Greenwood argues further that 
this view accords better with state practice and with the realities of 
modern military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation 
of Article 51, which would confine the right of self-defense to cases in 
which an armed attack had already occurred . . . 268 
Greenwood goes on to undertake a critical analysis of “Operation En-
during Freedom” against the benchmarks of “necessity,” “proportional-
ity” and “imminence.” He notes: 
The pre-emptive action that the United States and its allies took against 
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was . . . a lawful exercise of the right of self-
defense. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that self-defense 
would cover every military action that the United States or an ally 
might want to take against Al-Qaeda (or other terrorist groups) in other 
countries. The use of force in Afghanistan fell within the concept of 
self-defense because the threat from Al-Qaeda was imminent and be-
cause Afghanistan was quite openly affording sanctuary to large num-
bers of Al-Qaeda personnel. These considerations will not necessarily 
be present in every case.269 
There are, of course, debates as to whether “Operation Enduring Free-
dom” met the benchmark of proportionality. The U.S. case is not helped 
by calls for “regime change” in relation to rogue states which the United 
States is keen to put out of business, especially when they seek to de-
velop or acquire weapons of mass destruction. Assuming for the moment 
that the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan simply altered the balance of 
power in the civil war, when we juxtapose “Operation Enduring Free-
dom” against “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” significant legal questions are 
left open. As Michael J. Kelly notes: 
Unilaterally, the United States articulated its right to act preemptively 
to eliminate the threat posed by a potentially nuclear-armed Iraq. How-
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ever, because the existence of an imminent threat could not be estab-
lished, when the president brought the old anticipatory self-defense 
doctrine back to life, he eliminated that threshold and replaced it with 
the showing of only an “emerging” threat.270 
Kelly further avers that, in the absence of a link between Iraq and Al 
Qaeda, the United States sought a doctrine that would legitimize an at-
tack on Baghdad.271 Considering that 
a plain reading of Article 51 disallows striking Iraq absent an armed at-
tack, the Bush Administration is required to return to the legal history 
books and pull out another disused doctrine to justify any unilateral 
military action it may take. The one that seems to fit best, albeit imper-
fectly, is the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.272 
Notwithstanding the allure of a policy of anticipatory self-defence, 
there is little basis for such an extension of the UN Charter’s right to self-
defence. In justifying its attacks on Iraq, the United States relied on the 
concept of anticipatory self-defence, while seeking to dilute the Charter’s 
prohibition with customary international law. UN Charter aside, there is 
no basis in international law to support the doctrine of “pre-emption” 
encompassing a right to respond to threats that might materialize at some 
time in the future. The test is clear—imminence, which connotes imme-
diacy, is required to trigger self-defensive actions. A broad right of an-
ticipatory self-defence premised on a new standard of “emerging threat” 
would introduce dangerous uncertainties relating to the determination of 
potential threats justifying pre-emptive action. With this determination 
being state-based, the probability of opportunistic interventions justified 
as anticipatory self-defence will rise. After all, the reality is that only 
states with the military muscle will be able to make use of this avenue, 
and unilateral action will inevitably be colored by national interest con-
siderations. The development of such a right will likely prompt potential 
targets into striking first—to use rather than lose their biological, chemi-
cal, and nuclear weapons. 
3. Reprisals 
With regard to reprisals, the text of the UN Charter represents a con-
ventional rejection of the just-war theories of retribution abandoned in 
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the seventeenth century. 273 The purpose of the United Nations is to limit 
the use of force in international matters and to provide a forum for the 
resolution of conflict so as to prevent the need for war. In the history of 
the United Nations, there have been authoritative condemnations of both 
pre-emptive and retaliatory reprisal actions.274 It seems safe to conclude 
that both are widely expected to be inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations and are, therefore, proscribed under Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter. 
Previous military actions by the United States against terrorist-
supporting states elicited varying responses from the international com-
munity and the United Nations. In the case of the 1986 raid on Libya, the 
United States was largely condemned.275 The UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution condemning the United States for the attack by a 
vote of 79-28, with 33 abstentions.276 The UN Secretary General, Javier 
Perez de Cuellar, stated that the U.S. action violated international law.277 
Though a UN Security Council resolution echoing the General Assem-
bly’s sentiment was vetoed by the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France, France did call the air strikes “reprisals that itself revives the 
chain of violence.”278 In contrast, the United States’ 1993 cruise missile 
attack on Baghdad in response to the foiled Iraqi assassination attempt on 
former President Bush was met with support or tacit acquiescence.279 In 
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response to the U.S. presentation before the UN Security Council, the 
representatives of other member states either expressed support for the 
U.S. action or refrained from criticizing it; only China questioned the 
attack.280 The General Assembly took no action. 
Five years after the cruise missile attacks on Baghdad, world reaction 
to the 1998 U.S. strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan 
was mixed. Western European nations supported the U.S. actions to 
varying degrees, while Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared he was 
“outraged” by the “indecent” behavior of the United States.281 China is-
sued an ambiguous statement condemning terrorism, and Japan said it 
“understood [the United States’] resolute attitude towards terrorism.”282 
The aforementioned incidents were wrapped up in the rhetoric of self-
defence and retaliation, leading to the observation that, although the pre-
vailing view is that reprisals are illegal, states may still engage in them. 
For example, the 1986 bombing of Libya is cited as a peacetime repri-
sal and not an act of self-defense. Therefore, while writers state em-
phatically that reprisals are illegal, state practice continues to resort to 
them on occasion, cloaking them in terms of self-defense while remain-
ing careful to comply with Naulilaa criteria.283 
V. CONCLUSION 
The international community has long been uneasy with the use of 
military action as a counter-measure against terrorism. In 1986, when the 
United States bombed Libya in response to a terrorist act, President 
Reagan called the action “pre-emptive” on the ground that there was al-
ready a pattern of Libyan terrorist actions.284 The justification did not go 
over well with the international community. Roughly a decade later, in 
1998, after terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
the United States fired cruise missiles on Sudan and Afghanistan.285 
President Clinton argued that there was compelling evidence that the Al 
Qaeda terrorist network was planning to mount further attacks against 
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Americans, and he was thereafter entitled to act.286 Apart from a few 
western governments, which approved or kept quiet, most states con-
demned the Clinton air strikes.287 Conversely, the 2001 U.S. bombing of 
Afghanistan was widely supported by the international community. But 
in 2003, when the United States launched military action against Iraq, it 
did so against a background of protests from a large section of the inter-
national community, “squandering away the legal and moral capital it 
had gained in the action against Afghanistan.”288 
The attacks of September 11th, the response by the United States, and 
the international community’s approval of the military action in Afghani-
stan represent a new paradigm in international law relating to the use of 
force. Previously, acts of terrorism were seen as criminal acts, carried out 
by private, non-governmental entities.289 In contrast, the September 11th 
attacks were regarded as an act of war.290 This effectively marked a turn-
ing point in the long-standing premise in international law that force, 
aggression, and armed attacks are instruments of relations between 
states.291 Terrorism was no longer merely a serious threat to peace and 
stability to be combated through domestic and international penal mecha-
nisms; use of force is now seen as an attractive and satisfying counter-
measure in managing terrorism. However, subsequent U.S. military ac-
tion in Iraq was shrouded in confusing legal justifications and question-
able, even faulty evidence. This has raised skepticism among scholars 
and the international community that self-defence was used and misused, 
thus preventing the evolution of any meaningful state practice. 
As a result of the United States’ aggressive policy, certain discarded 
pre-UN Charter doctrines are being revived in one form or the other, no-
tably the concept of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence. Some crit-
ics have warned against the inherent dangers of resurrecting such pre-
Charter doctrines, noting that: 
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One of the very reasons the world community decided to do away with 
them was to reduce legal justifications for, and thus the possibility of, 
unilateral military action. The pre-Charter doctrines were used erratic-
ally and unreliably prior to 1945. Now, if these doctrines are returned 
to service by the world’s superpower and are allowed to pass into cus-
tomary practice once again, we will find ourselves in a time warp back 
to 1945—a period of fear, uncertainty and suspicion; a period of global 
dominance by a handful of nations; a period defined by the geopolitics 
of raw power and militaristic influence; a period of instability devoid of 
collective security. Even more disturbingly, some of the re-articulated 
rules have been watered down to allow more latitude in unilateral ac-
tion.292 
However in a spirited defence of pre-emptive action, other scholars as-
sert: “Waiting for an aggressor to fire the first shot may be a fitting code 
for television westerns, but it is unrealistic for policy-makers entrusted 
with the solemn responsibility of safe-guarding the well-being of their 
citizenry.”293 However, these critics are missing the central point—when 
military action is undertaken, things get real—real bombs, real missiles, 
real deaths. Unilateral state sponsored military action must not be based 
on mere apprehension backed by dubious or unclear intelligence. Once 
the military action is over it cannot be unmade by commissions of inquir-
ies or concessions that perhaps a few facts were overstated. UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, in remarks regarding anticipatory self-defence dur-
ing the opening of the 58th session of the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2003, summed up the dilemma thus: 
Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the 
inherent right of self-defense. But until now it has been understood that 
when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with 
broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique 
legitimacy provided by the United Nations. 294 
Annan concluded that in light of the reality of weapons of mass de-
struction, “We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment 
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no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was 
founded.”295 
The UN Charter seems to present a neat and tidy regime on the use of 
force. Nonetheless it reflects the drafters’ singular focus on creating a 
political system to govern conflicts between states and does not directly 
address the subtler modes in which terrorists began to operate in the post-
World War II period.296 The drafters did not contemplate the existence of 
international terrorists nor “fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and 
technology of modern day terrorism.”297 In view of the fact that terrorist 
groups appear to have reached a global sophistication, there is little doubt 
that international terrorism presents a threat with which traditional theo-
ries for the use of military force are inadequate to deal, and were unan-
ticipated when the UN Charter was drafted.298 The international commu-
nity has no option but to develop new strategies within the rubric of in-
ternational law to deal with terrorism and the reality that international 
law seems to restrict the use of military force to actions in self-defence. 
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